Concluding the peace talks held between 10 July 1992 and 24 June 1993 in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, and Kinihira, Republic of Rwanda, from 19 to 25 July 1993 under the auspices of the Ombudsman, His Excellency .M. Ali Hassan MWINYI, President of the United Republic of Tanzania, in the presence of the representative of the Ombudsman, His Excellency MOBUTU SESE SEKO, President of the Republic of Zaire and representatives of the current Presidents of the OAU, His Excellency Abdou DIOUF, President of the Republic of Senegal, and Hosni MUBARAK, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Secretary-General of OAU, Dr. Salim Ahmed SALIM, Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Boutros Boutros GHALI and observers for the Federal Republic of Belgium, Burundi, France, Germany, Nigeria, Uganda, The United States of America and Zimbabwe; Fighting continued until 1993 and both sides were heavily involved in the fighting, in violation of the ceasefire agreement they had reached in July 1992 after occupying much of the territory in northern Rwanda in the previous days. On February 12, 1993, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) declared an immediate ceasefire, which Rwandan government troops should also observe immediately. March after a high-level meeting from 5 to 7 March. The NMOG remained intact as a watchdog of the ceasefire agreement.10 The NMOG confirmed the withdrawal of RPF troops from the Mutara, Byumba and Ruhengeri areas until February 8, 1993 before the position.11 After the withdrawal, the area became a demilitarized zone between the government and RPF forces and was administered by the NMOG.12 As part of the Arusha negotiations, the international community was called upon to: provide a “neutral international force” to help implement the peace agreements. This included support for the facilitation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the securing of funding for the programme (documents 10 and 39). However, the international community struggled to raise the funds, the Rwandans never installed the transitional government, and the demobilization programme was never implemented (document 23). The civil war began in earnest after Ndadaye`s assassination. The CNDD-FDD, like other armed movements such as PALIPEHUTU, saw itself as a defender of the Hutu cause. However, it has suffered internal upheavals resulting from differences over ideology, strategy and tactics.

Its original members were supporters of Ndadaye and his Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU). They viewed the 1993 crisis as political rather than ethnic, and advocated a multi-ethnic vision closely linked to Ndadaye`s policies. The Arusha Agreement was a United Nations-sponsored agreement between the RPF, a predominantly Tutsi rebel group, and the government of Rwanda. This article will deal specifically with the section on military power-sharing (demobilization and reintegration) of the Arusha Agreement, which was a small but crucial part of the broader political context in which the genocide took place. These documents highlight the failure of the international community to fully support Rwanda`s peace efforts, as well as the failure of the Rwandan government and the RPF to implement peace. Protocol to the Agreement on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties, signed in Arusha on 3 August 1993 The Arusha Agreement provided for the establishment of a broad-based transitional government (BBTG)[2], which would include the insurgent RPF and the five political parties that had formed a transitional government since April 1992 in preparation for the parliamentary elections. The agreements contained other points deemed necessary for a lasting peace: the rule of law, the repatriation of refugees from combat and power-sharing agreements, and the merger of government and rebel armies. A few weeks after the signing of the Arusha Agreement in August 1993 (Document 32), Joyce Leader wrote to the US Secretary of State, warning that “although the leaders of both sides have signed the peace agreement, neither side trusts the intentions of the others” (Document 18). .